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CROSS-APPELLEE’S SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Cross-Appellants seek to reverse the District Court’s denial of their motion
for attorneys’ fees and costs under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2)
(“FHA”). The standard for awarding fees and costs to a prevailing defendant in an
FHA case is whether plaintiff’s case was “frivolous, unreasonable, or without
foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.” A case is not
frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, if there exists case law under the
FHA that supports the party’s litigation position. Cross-Appellants’ argument for
reversal defies Supreme Court and 4th Circuit precedent.
Cross-Appellants argument that attorney’s fees and costs should be awarded
to them under Virginia law, due to the provisions and requirements of the Lee’s
Crossing Covenants, is in direct contravention of the public policy considerations
in FHA and other civil rights cases.
This Court should affirm the District Court’s decision denying CrossAppellants’ motion for attorney’s fees and costs under the FHA.
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APPELLANTS’ REPLY BRIEF
ARGUMENT
Appellees’ own brief demonstrates how expansive the genuine disputes of
material facts are in this case. The argumentative nature of Appellees’ Statement of
Facts alone demonstrates the extent of these factual disputes. The Scogginses have
submitted evidence to support every aspect of their case, while Appellees’ strategy
has been to assert that the evidence is insufficient, to utilize erroneous legal
arguments that limit the effectiveness of the evidence, or make unsupported
accusations. This case is replete with contested issues of fact. See J.A. at 166–71.
Under the standard for summary judgment, the trial court’s order should be
reversed and the case remanded for trial so the factual disputes can be resolved by
a trier of fact.
I.

APPELLEES’ REPEATED DENIALS CONSTITUTE A
CONTINUING VIOLATION OF THE FAIR HOUSING ACT WHICH
MAKES IT RIPE FOR JUDICIAL RESOLUTION.
This Court held in Bryant Woods Inn, Inc. v. Howard County, Md., 124 F.3d

597, 602 (4th Cir. 1997), that an issue is sufficiently concrete for judicial
resolution once an accommodation is denied. Id. at 602. A “denial can be both
actual or constructive, as an indeterminate delay has the same effect as an outright
denial.” Groome Res. Ltd., LLC v. Parish of Jefferson, 234 F.3d 192 (5th Cir.
2000). Even if “the request is made orally,” or made in a manner that does not
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prescribe to the “provider’s preferred forms or procedures for making such
requests,” it may be deemed to be a failure or denial to provide a reasonable
accommodation (or modification). J.A. at 1241–1242, ¶ 12; 1242, ¶ 15 and J.A.
1254–1255, ¶ 15.1 Here, Appellees actually and constructively denied the
Scogginses’ requests continuously over a prolonged period of time, most recently
on October 18, 2010. J.A. at 2053–54. Therefore, this case is fit for judicial
resolution.
A.

Appellees Continually Denied The Scogginses’ Ramp Requests.

The record shows that Appellees denied the Scogginses’ requests through a
series of related discriminatory acts before they filed suit. See Opening Br. at 37.
Actual Denials of the Ramp Modification Requests:
1. In 2003, Jack Merritt (“Merrit”) denied the Scogginses’ initial request for
the ramp without allowing them an opportunity to submit a written
application. J.A. at 394, ¶ 7 and 980.
2. In 2007, the Scogginses submitted a second request for the ramp, which was
again summarily denied by Merritt. J.A. at 394, ¶ 13.
3. In 2010, the Scogginses made a final attempt and sent a letter request to
property manager Mike Arndt. J.A. at 394 and 986.
4. On September 11, 2010, “almost 16 months after the May, 2009 [ATV]
request,” John Bennett (“Bennett”), who is not a member of the
Architectural Review Board (“ARB”), requested information the Appellees

1

See Opening Br. at 41 for discussion of deference. Additionally, 42 U.S.C. §
3608(a) vests HUD with the authority and responsibility to interpret § 3604. See 42
U.S.C.A. § 3608 (West)
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already had about the ramp construction. J.A. at 395 and 988.
5. On September 20, 2010, the Scogginses provided Bennett the requested
additional information, in spite of the fact that it was the LCHA and not the
ARB making the request. J.A. at 395 and 986–87.
6. On September 22, 2010, Bennett responded, “denying any recollection of
[the Scogginses’] previous requests for a ramp.” J.A. at 395 and 416.
7. On October 18, 2010, Merritt, President of the ARB, denied the Scogginses’
ramp request via letter. J.A. at 395 and 420–21.
Appellees attempt to dispute their discriminatory acts by superficially
relying on the record; however, significant portions of Appellees’ recitation of
facts on pages 24 and 25 of the Response Brief are unsubstantiated and should not
be considered. In contrast, the record undeniably reflects that the Appellees
expressly denied the Scogginses’ modification requests in 2003, 2007, and 2010.
J.A. at 394–95.
B.

Appellees’ Unreasonable Delay In Deciding The Scogginses’
Requests Constitutes A Constructive Denial.

The Appellees unreasonably delayed deciding the Scogginses’
accommodation and modification requests. In Groome, the Court held that
although the Parish officials in charge of the application did not “formally den[y]
the request,” the Parish’s “unjustified and indeterminate delay” of ninety-five days
“had the same effect of undermining the anti-discriminatory purpose of the FHAA”
and therefore constituted a denial. Id. at 199–200. Ultimately, the court held that
the issue was fit for review. Id.
4

In the present case, Appellees intentionally ignored and delayed deciding the
Scogginses’ requests well beyond the time presented in Groome. The events listed
1–7, supra at 3-4, are also constructive denials of the modification requests.
Constructive Denials of the ATV Accommodation Requests:
1. In May 2009, while their multiple requests for the ramp were pending, the
Scogginses made their first request that Jacob be permitted to operate an
ATV. J.A. at 394.
2. The Scogginses “received no response to [the] May 19, 2009 request for
permission for an ATV.” J.A. at 395.
3. In August 2010, the Scogginses sent their second request for the ATV. The
Association still did not respond. J.A. at 395.
4. By September 2010, the Association still had not responded to the
Scogginses’ ATV requests. J.A. at 395.
5. The Association never responded to the Scogginses’ ATV requests, took no
proactive measure or initiative otherwise to meet with or discuss information
with respect to the Scogginses’ ATV requests. J.A. at 395, 641–42, 768, 733,
933–34, 936, and 946.
Approximately 2,552 days elapsed between the time the Scogginses
submitted the ramp request in 2003 and the filing of the lawsuit. Approximately,
512 days elapsed between the time the ATV request was submitted in 2009 and the
filing of the lawsuit. See Opening Br. at 24. The fact that the Appellees remarkably
failed to inform the Scogginses of a decision regarding the accommodation
requests for the ATV made in 2009 and 2010 indisputably amounts to an
unreasonable delay and indicates that the Appellees constructively denied the
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requests. These substantial delays clearly appear unjustified and indeterminate
compared to Groome and have “the same effect of undermining the antidiscriminatory purpose of the FHAA.” See Resp. Brief at 24 and Opening Br. at
37–38. The countless delays amount to a constructive denial and render the Fair
Housing claims fit for judicial review.
Appellees mischaracterize and confuse the record by continuing to falsely
accuse the Scogginses of being disobliging by “denying” Bennett into their home.
See Resp. Br. at 24. Appellees, however, fail to provide the context of the facts.
The record at page 395 clarifies that when Appellees sent Bennett to supposedly
request to meet and discuss the ramp modification request with the Scogginses in
2010, the requests that had been pending with the Association for approximately
seven years since the initial request in 2003. Notwithstanding, the Scogginses had
already provided the Appellees the information necessary to build the ramp. See
J.A. at 988 and Opening Brief at 42–43. The Scogginses did not welcome Bennett
into their home after a seven year delay. They were perplexed why Bennett would
want to meet with them if Lee’s Crossing and its official representatives possess
the indispensable authority to grant the request.2 In essence, the decision was not a

2

At the time Bennett proposed to visit the Scogginses’ home to supposedly discuss
the ramp request, Bennett was not a member of the ARB, the final arbiter on the
ramp request, but only served as a messenger. J.A. at 162–63, 666–67 and 620–21.
As such, the Scogginses were not obligated to allow Bennett to visit their home in
an unauthorized capacity. J.A. at 807. Additionally, no one from the ARB
6

denial but rather served as a last resort appeal to urge the Association to review the
Scogginses’ numerous requests. J.A. at 418. Moreover, Bennett has denied any
recollection concerning the request for the ramp. J.A. at 685 and 162–63.
C.

Appellees’ Request For Additional Information On The ATV
Request, After An Unreasonable Sixteen (16) Months Delay,
Constitutes A Constructive Denial.

In addition to the continuing denials of the ramp request by express denials,
unjustified delays and disguised requests for more information, the Association’s
request for additional information after an unreasonable sixteen-month (16) delay
since the initial ATV request in 2009 served as another ploy to grossly delay and
constructively deny the Scogginses request. J.A. at 395. A housing provider
constructively denies a request when he refuses to render a decision unless the
requester provides unwarranted information. See U.S. v. Town of Garner, NC, 720
F. Supp. 2d 721, 729 (E.D.N.C. 2010); Thompson v. U.S. Dept. of Hous. & Urban
Dev., 348 F. Supp. 2d 398, 417 (D. Md. 2005); U.S. v. Hialeah Hous. Auth. 418 F.
Appx. 872, 876 (11th Cir. 2011); Overlook Mut. Homes, Inc. v. Spencer, 415 F.
Appx. 617, 622 (6th Cir. 2011) (unpublished). As such, Appellees’ request for
additional information from the Scogginses served as a ploy and went “above and
beyond what the FHAA, Code of Federal Regulations [24 C.F.R. § 100], and the
Modifications Joint Statement (“Joint Statement”) require” – particularly when the
contacted the Scogginses concerning their requests for the modification. J.A. at
395.
7

Scogginses had already submitted every requested detail. See J.A. at 181, 988,
2053–54, and Opening Br. at 42–43.
Housing providers may gather adequate information to learn of the
requester’s disability and desire for an accommodation. See Opening Br. at 26.
However:
If a person’s disability is obvious, or otherwise known to the housing
provider, and if the need for requested modification is also readily
apparent or known, then the provider may not request any additional
information about the requester’s disability or the disability-related need
for the modification. J.A. at 1243, ¶ 17.
The trial court held that “there is no dispute in […] that Jacob Scoggins is
‘handicapped’ and is entitled to reasonable accommodations and modifications
under the FHAA. There is likewise no real dispute that Defendants knew or should
have known of his disability.” J.A. at 272. Considering that Appellees are well
aware of Jacob’s paraplegic condition, and accordingly, his obvious need for the
ramp and ATV, their intrusive request for additional information, especially after a
sixteen-month delay, was improper and a denial.
Based on the foregoing evidence of the Appellees’ continual actual and
constructive denials, the Appellees evidently were not ready and/or willing to
process the Scogginses’ application as the Appellees attempt to portray. See Resp.
Br. at 24. As a result, the Scogginses had no choice but to turn to the courts to
enforce their legal rights. The Scogginses did not act prematurely in filing their
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suit. If the Scogginses bowed tacitly before the Association’s indeterminate delays,
the Appellees’ past actions indicate that Appellees would have denied the request
after an unreasonable delay of an additional 30-day review period and an another
calendar year after the formal denial. See Opening Br. at 14, 27, 37, 38, and J.A. at
420–21. In fact, even after being served with of the Complaint, Appellees sent the
Scogginses a written denial. J.A. at 395 and 979.
Thus, the evidence establishes that the trial court erred in denying the
applicability of the continuing violations doctrine to recognize the constructive
denials and, consequently, erred in granting summary judgment.
D.

Alternatively, The Requisite Second Prong Of The Ripeness Test,
Undue Hardship, Underscores Appellees’ Faltering Claim For
Dismissal Due To Ripeness.

The Scogginses will endure undue hardship unlike the Appellees if the case
is dismissed on ripeness grounds. Appellees conveniently fail to address the
requisite undue hardship prong of the ripeness test. See Resp. Br. at 21–25. Courts
emphasize that housing discrimination creates a uniquely immediate injury.
Assisted Living Ass’n. v. Moorestown Twp., 996 F. Supp. 409 (D.N.J. 1998). “Such
discrimination, which under the FHA includes a refusal to make accommodations,
makes these controversies ripe.” Id. at 426.
Withholding court consideration now will clearly result in undue hardship to
the Scogginses, and no hardship to the Appellees. Absent a court review, Jacob
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Scoggins will be permanently barred from entering and exiting his house like any
ordinary person. Furthermore, his safety will be permanently compromised as a
result of having only one exit out of his home. Additionally, the Scogginses’
requests place neither financial nor administrative burdens on Appellees, or result
in a fundamental alteration to the nature of the community. See Opening Br. at 20.3
Moreover, the Association has not and will not suffer any financial hardship. The
Scogginses, however, have expended $9,000 to comply with the Appellees’ request
that they plant adult trees to screen the cars in their driveway as a result of building
the interior ramp. J.A. at 394. Therefore, like in Groome, “further delay in
obtaining judicial resolution will cause additional harm” to the Scogginses. See
Groome Resources Ltd, 234 F.3d at 200.
Finally, Appellees rely on an unpublished opinion, Brayboy v. Robeson
Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 401 F. Appx. 802 (4th Cir. 2010) (unpublished), cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 200, reh’g denied, 132 S. Ct. 804 (2011), and misguidedly argue that the
Scogginses forfeited appellate review of ripeness by not raising it in their Opening
Brief. This argument is without merit. First, Appellees conveniently fail to
reference that Brayboy is unpublished and therefore, it possesses no precedential
value. Second, the Scogginses inherently preserved the ripeness of their FHA

3

The Scoggins previously consulted with a realtor and property expert who
informed them that building a ramp on their house would not “detract” from or
diminish the property value as much as planting the trees would. J.A. at 394.
10

claims in their very discussion of continuing violations, discriminatory intent, and
numerous denials of requests in the Opening Brief, and thus, waiver is not at issue.
Therefore, this court should dismiss any consideration of Appellees’
ripeness claim because further delay would place concrete, undue hardship on the
Scogginses and such result frustrates the purpose of the Fair Housing Act.
E.

Appellees’ Numerous Separate, Yet Related, Discriminatory Acts
Constitute A Continuing Violation.

These repeated and related discriminatory denials, actual or constructive,
constitute a continuing violation under Havens Realty v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363
(1982). The Supreme Court in Havens Realty held that a pattern of five separate
yet related acts of illegal discrimination creates a continuing violation which tolls
the statute of limitations. Id. at 381. Similarly here, Appellees engaged in a
prolonged period of discriminatory behavior. See Part I.A−C, supra; and Opening
Br. at 37–38.
The trial court erred when it ignored the holding in Havens Realty. J.A. at
274−75. The trial court, assuming that all denials had in fact occurred, could not
find a continuing violation. Id. Yet, if five denials constitutes a continuing
violation, certainly twelve denials should as well. Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 381.
Appellees’ conveniently ignore Havens Realty and fail to distinguish it from
the present case. Unconvincingly, Appellees rely only on Miller v. King George
County, 277 F. Appx. 297 (4th Cir. 2008) (unpublished). Resp. Br. at 46. Miller
11

also stands as an unpublished opinion with no precedential value. Nonetheless, the
case is readily distinguishable. In Miller, the plaintiff challenged the
constitutionality of a water ordinance. Miller, 277 F. Appx. at 298. The city found
the plaintiff in violation of the ordinance and took several legal actions to bring the
plaintiff into compliance. Id. at 299. Id. This Court held that these legal actions
were not “additional ‘violations,’” but “merely the county’s attempts to bring the
[plaintiff] into compliance.” Id.
Miller is not applicable to the Scogginses’ claims. The Scogginses suffered
from numerous discriminatory acts that were not ill effects of the first violation.
Opening Br. at p. 37–38. Rather, each illegal act was a denial of a separate request
for a reasonable modification and reasonable accommodation. To hold otherwise
would eviscerate the continuing violation doctrine, and run contrary to the
Supreme Court’s holding in Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 381.
Therefore, this Court should uphold Havens Realty and reverse the trial
court’s decision.
II.

JACOB SCOGGINS NEEDS THE WHEELCHAIR RAMP TO
FULLY ENJOY THE PREMISES AS PROVIDED BY SECTION
3604(f)(3)(A) OF THE FAIR HOUSING ACT.
In their opening brief, the Scogginses raised the critical issue that showing

necessity in a reasonable accommodation request is clearly different than a
modification request. The complaint and the arguments put forward clearly
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requested a modification for the wheelchair ramp. Despite the Scogginses’
properly pleading a denial of their modification request, the trial court reviewed
Appellees’ motion for summary judgment under the Bryant Woods reasonable
accommodation test. This was plain error.
Had the trial court considered their request under a modification standard of
necessity, summary judgment would have been denied. However, neither this
Circuit, nor any other, has implemented a standard for reasonable modification
cases. The Scogginses, based on the framework of the plain meaning of the
reasonable accommodation standard of necessity, and the plain meaning of the
modification language, suggested the following possible standard:
The FHA thus requires a modification for persons with handicaps if
the modification is (1) reasonable and (2) necessary (3) to afford the
handicapped persons full enjoyment of the premises.
See the accommodation standard in Bryant Woods, 124 F.3d at 60.4
Clear factual and legal differences exist between an accommodation and a
modification request that require different and distinct “necessity” standards. The
party burdened (financial and otherwise) to bring about the request serves as the
essential difference between an accommodation and modification. See
3604(f)(3)(A) (allocating costs related to the modification to the party requesting
4

The Scogginses suggest adjusting the Bryant Woods’ standard only where the
language of 3604(f)(3)(A) (“modification” and “full enjoyment of the premises”)
differed from the language of 3604(f)(3)(B) (“accommodation” and “equal
opportunity to use and enjoy the property”).
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it); 3604(f)(3)(B) (placing burden of action on non-requesting party). Here, the
Scoggins family, not the Appellees, will pay for and install Jacob’s wheelchair
ramp. The case law surrounding the Bryant Woods accommodation standard of
necessity hinges on the fact that accommodations allocate a burden of affirmative
action on the non-requesting party. See Bryant Woods, 124 F.3d at 604, (“the
requirement of even-handed treatment of handicapped persons does not include
affirmative action by which handicapped persons would have a greater opportunity
than non-handicapped persons … Congress only prescribed an equal opportunity,”
(Emphasis added)); See also Opening Br. at 32–6.
In this case, the Scogginses committed to pay all costs associated with the
wheelchair ramp. Since Appellees’ are not “affirmatively burdened” by this request
(as they would have been with an accommodation request), Jacob and his family
should be permitted to determine what Jacob needs in order to “fully enjoy” his
dwelling.
A.

The Issue Of Jacob’s Need For A Wheelchair Ramp Is Not
Barred On Appeal.

Appellees contend that the Scogginses are barred from bringing “new
arguments” on appeal. See Resp. Br. at 36. However, this is not the standard.5 This

5

In support of their argument that the Scogginses are barred from arguing Jacob’s
need for a reasonable modification, Appellees’ cite footnote five of U.S. v. Evans,
404 F.3d 227, 236 (4th Cir. 2005). Appellees cite this footnote, which uses the
term “argument” rather than “issue,” in order to paint the standard as one that bars
14

Court has stated that a party’s failure to raise an issue in a complaint or opposition
to summary judgment constitutes a waiver of that issue. Estate of Weeks, 99 F.
Appx. At 474. However, the Scogginses raised the “issue” that a wheelchair ramp
was necessary for Jacob to “fully enjoy” his dwelling (pursuant to section
3604(f)(3)(A)) in both their complaint and in opposition to Appellees’ motion for
summary judgment. J.A. at 21, ¶ 14, and 187. Therefore, the Scogginses did not
waive this issue and are not barred from making their arguments on appeal.
B.

Statutory Construction And Relevant Legislative History
Supports The Scogginses’ Recommendation Of A “Full
Enjoyment” Modification Standard.

Since Bryant Woods adopts section 3604(f)(3)(B)’s (accommodations)
“equally opportunity” language to explain the importance of balancing the
competing interests associated with accommodations, the test using that language
is strictly limited to accommodation requests. Id. at 604. The Scogginses supported
this argument in their opening brief by citing well-established principles of
statutory construction, namely that Congress intends sections drafted differently to
be applied differently. See Davis v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803,
809, (1989) (“It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of

new “arguments” on appeal. New arguments are permitted, as long as the “issue”
was properly raised in the complaint or in opposition to summary judgment. See
Estate of Weeks v. Advance Stores Co., Inc., 99 F. Appx. 470, 474 (4th Cir. 2004).
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a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall
statutory scheme”); See Opening Br. at 33–35.
Furthermore, the legislative history corroborates that Congress intended
section 3604(f)(3)(A) (modifications) to be treated separately from section
3604(f)(3)(B) (accommodations). Congress intended that “full enjoyment” in
section 3604(f)(3)(A) have a different meaning than “equal opportunity to use and
enjoy” in section 3604(f)(3)(B), because it defined them differently in both the
statute and relevant legislative history. As to “full enjoyment” in section
3604(f)(3)(A):
The Committee understands that the nature of individual handicaps, and
therefore the potential need for environmental modifications, varies greatly.
Therefore the term “full enjoyment” has been used here to assure that
reasonable modifications required by individual tenants to assure that he or
she could fully use the premises would be protected under this Act. Any
modifications protected under this act must be reasonable and must be made
at the expense of the individual with handicaps.
HOUSE REPORT NO. 100–711, H.R. REP. 100–711, 25, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2173, 2186 (emphasis added). As to “equal opportunity to use and enjoy” in
section 3604(f)(3)(B):
New Subsection 3604(f)(3)(B) makes it illegal to refuse to make reasonable
accommodation in rules, policies, practices, or services if necessary to
permit a person with handicaps equal opportunity to use and enjoy a
dwelling…This section would require that changes be made to such
traditional rules or practices if necessary to permit a person with handicaps
an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.
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HOUSE REPORT NO. 100–711, H.R. REP. 100–711, 25, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2173, 2186. Congress drafted these two distinct sections to effectuate two distinct
purposes. See Davis, 489 U.S. at 809.
In contrast to Appellees’ contention that a modification standard would be
“wholly amorphous,” section 3604(f)(3)(A) sets forth a precise standard for
granting a modification, which must (1) begin with a dialogue between the parties,
(2) be reasonable, and (3) be necessary to afford “full enjoyment.” See Resp. Br. at
38. Both accommodations and modifications require that a request be reasonable
and necessary. The sole difference is that a disabled person would have more
leeway in determining what they believe to be necessary because they are paying
for the modification and not placing any burden on the other party. Therefore, a
modification standard would be no more “amorphous” than the existing
accommodation standard.
C.

The Trial Court’s Use Of The Reasonable Accommodation
Standard of Necessity Test Was A Departure From Its Prior
Modification Request Analysis.

In Nester v. Analostan Homes Association, Inc., 2002 WL 32657037 (E.D.
Va. 2002), the trial court reviewed a plaintiff’s request to replace the shingles on
the roof of his home with a preferred brand that plaintiff believed would afford him
fire-safety. Id. at 1. In analyzing the plaintiff’s need for additional fire-safety, the
trial court did not perform a Bryant Woods reasonable accommodation standard of
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necessity analysis, despite the fact that Nester was decided eight-years after Bryant
Woods. Id. at 2. The trial court concluded that the fire-retardant shingles would
provide “Plaintiff with the full enjoyment of his premises because of its superior
fire protection.” Id. at 3, (emphasis added). Although the court did not end up
granting the modification request for other reasons, it did conclude that fire-safety
modifications are necessary for a mobility-impaired persons’ full enjoyment of the
premises. Id. at 3.
Even though there are no other modification cases in the Fourth Circuit that
have applied the Bryant Woods’ accommodation test, Appellees’ still contend that
it is the proper standard. In support, Appellees cited three accommodation-based
request cases, in addition to Nester. See Resnick v. 392 Central Park West
Condominium, 2007 WL 2375750 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Gavin v. Spring Ridge
Conservancy, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 685 (D. Md. 1995), aff’d, 92 F.3d 1178 (4th Cir.
1996); and Loren v. Sosser, 309 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 2002). These accommodation
cases are not on-point because they do not indicate whether the accommodation
standard of necessity can be appropriately or properly applied to a modification
request.
Appellees’ reliance on Nester was also misplaced because Nester establishes
that the trial court has not formerly used the Bryant Woods’ standard of necessity
to review a modification request. Therefore, in this case, the trial court’s use of the
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Bryant Woods’ test was clear error. Had the trial court applied the “full enjoyment”
standard, as it did in Nester, then it would have held that a wheelchair ramp to the
front door of Jacob’s dwelling was necessary.
D.

A Wheelchair Ramp Is Necessary To Afford Jacob Scoggins “Full
Enjoyment Of The Premises.”

A wheelchair ramp is necessary to afford Jacob the ability to enter and exit
his home in the same manner and location as his family was properly alleged in the
First Amended Complaint, J.A. at 21, ¶ 14.
The trial court reviewed Jacob’s need for a wheelchair ramp under the
Bryant Woods “amelioration” requirement calling for plaintiff to demonstrate “a
direct link between the proposed accommodation and the equal opportunity to be
provided to the person with a disability.” J.A. at 272. See Bryant Woods Inn, Inc.,
124 F.3d at 604. Applying this test, the trial court erroneously granted summary
judgment for the Appellees. The trial court stated:
. . . Plaintiffs [Scogginses] have not brought any evidence that placing a
ramp on the exterior of the home would directly ameliorate the effect of the
disability in a way that the current ramp [in the garage] does not . . . While
having an additional ramp on the front of the home may be the Scogginses’
preference, it cannot be said to be causally connected to ameliorating the
effect of Jacob’s disability. Therefore, the accommodation cannot be said to
be necessary.
JA at 272–73, (emphasis added).
The ruling misstated the “effect” Jacob seeks to ameliorate as general access
to his family’s home. Rather, Jacob endeavors to gain the ability to enter and exit
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through the front door like everyone else.6 J.A. at 21, ¶ 14. A ramp would directly
ameliorate this “effect” of Jacob’s disability by allowing him to enter through that
door. Therefore, the Scogginses already alleged enough facts to prove Jacob’s need
for a modification, or at minimum, enough to create a genuine issue of fact
necessary to overcome summary judgment.
1.

Jacob Needs To Have An Alternative Exit In Case Of An
Emergency For Full Enjoyment Of The Premises.

The Scogginses’ First Amended Complaint also alleges that Jacob needs to
have an additional entry or exit from his home in case of an emergency, especially
a fire. J.A. at 21 ¶ 16. The Scogginses pointed out that “each year fires kill more
Americans than all natural disasters combined, and the most common place fires
start in the home are in kitchens.” J.A. at 189.
Currently, Jacob can only exit his home through the kitchen and out the
garage via the garage door ramp. If there is a fire in the kitchen, Jacob will not be
able to escape. Although Appellees state that Jacob also has the walk-out basement
as a point of exit, if Jacob is not in the basement at the time of a fire he would have
to first get out of his wheelchair, strap himself into an electronic chair-lift to get
down the stairs, then get himself out through the door, and literally drag himself to

6

Jacob testified that as a result of not being able to enter through the front door
that “[he] did not feel equal to his family.” He testified, “I felt I was second class.
Like I was not good enough to go through the front of my home.” J.A. at 434.
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safety.7 J.A. at 444–45, 166. In defense of their denial, Appellees have
mischaracterized the home’s true accessibility. See Resp. Br. at 41.
The trial court incorrectly identified Jacob’s request for an additional, safer
exit point as a preference instead of as a need. J.A. at 273. Appellees’ continued
effort to paint this request as a preference only reinforces the fact that the trial
court erred in applying accommodation law. Since Appellees’ only interest in
opposing the ramp that will cost them nothing is aesthetic at best (or based on a
discriminatory animus at worst), there is no reason that Appellees should be
permitted to qualify Jacob’s “full enjoyment” of his home as a preference. J.A. at
273, 1793–94. His need is abundantly clear.
In Nester, the same trial court that heard this case determined that fireretardant shingles were necessary to provide a mobility-impaired plaintiff “full
enjoyment” of his home. Nester, 2002 WL 32657037 at 3. Although the court did
not permit the installation of the plaintiff’s “preferred brand” of shingles, its
decision to do so was based on the fact that they substantially accomplished the
same “full enjoyment” goal as the existing shingles. Id. In this case, neither the
garage ramp nor the walkout basement substantially satisfies Jacob’s need to fully
7

In the event that there is a fire, the walkout-basement can hardly be considered an
acceptable exit as it leads to a patio, no longer than eleven-feet, which ends in a
grassy, sloped terrain, inaccessible to a wheelchair user. J.A. at 166; see also J.A.
at 2198–2203 (photo exhibit of backyard). Additionally, use of an electronic
chairlift during a fire cannot be considered a safe alternative for egress. J.A. at
444–45.
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enjoy his dwelling. Since Jacob, like the plaintiff in Nester, is a mobility-impaired
person who could benefit from a fire-safety modification, the issue of Jacob’s need
for the ramp should be remanded for further consideration under the proper
modification standard.
III.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS INAPPROPRIATE FOR THE ATV
ACCOMMODATION CLAIM BECAUSE THERE ARE GENUINE
ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACTS.
Every aspect of the Scogginses’ reasonable accommodation claim is

supported by evidence. While Appellees dispute these material facts, the existence
of this dispute demonstrates that summary judgment is inappropriate.
A.

The Scogginses’ Evidence Establishes Necessity.

The record establishes that the Scogginses submitted sufficient evidence to
prove that the ATV accommodation is necessary for Jacob to be independently
mobile. J.A. at 392. Appellees attempt to twist the evidence to unfairly paint the
Scogginses as misrepresenting the facts. See Resp. Br. at 26.
Under the lay person standard, Jacob’s testimony properly establishes that an
ATV accommodation is necessary for him because a lay person can readily
comprehend his disability and use of a wheelchair. The Scogginses are not required
to use expert testimony to establish necessity. See Opening Br. at 18. It is
uncontested that Jacob’s disability necessitates the use of some device for him to
move independently. Though Jacob owns both a manual and motorized
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wheelchair, Jacob testified that both are unfit for use on unpaved roads. J.A. at 448.
Finally, the strain that a manual chair causes on his shoulders are well within the
comprehension of a layperson.
As to the power wheelchair, Jacob testified that he does not use it outside on
Lee’s Crossing’s roads because he has been instructed that he should not operate
the wheelchair on unpaved roads. J.A. at 452–453. Appellees also attempt to
characterize Jacob’s tricycle as a viable alternative to the manual wheelchair. Resp.
Br. at 28. However, Jacob has not used the tricycle in some time because of the
time it takes for him to place himself in the tricycle, and the strain this causes on
his body. J.A. at 454–57.
Appellees offer no evidence to rebut the Scogginses’ evidence. Rather,
Appellees misinterpret Matarese v. Archstone Pentagon City, 761 F. Supp. 2d 346
(E.D. Va. 2011)8 to hold that expert testimony is required in all housing
discrimination cases. See Resp. Br. at 28–29; J.A. at 276. Yet, Matarese applies the
lay person standard to the very situation in which Appellees contend expert
testimony is required.
The court in Matarese only required an expert witness since the question of
“whether a proposed accommodation will ameliorate the effects allegedly caused
8

Appellees also discuss case Douglas v. Victor Capital Group, 21 F.Supp.2d 379
(S.D.N.Y. 1998). However, Douglas does not apply the lay person standard like
Matarese. Id. at 391.
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by certain chemicals to the degree necessary to afford [plaintiff’s] equal
opportunity in housing and not just ameliorate the burdens shared by all
individuals exposed to chemicals, is not within the knowledge of a layperson.” Id.
(Emphasis added).9
Appellees also attempt to distinguish Katz v. City Metal Co., Inc., 87 F.3d 26
(1st Cir. 1996) (considering the effects of a heart attack within the knowledge of a
lay person), and Marinelli v. City of Erie, Pennsylvania, 216 F.3d 354, 357–8 (3d
Cir. 2000) (holding that neck and arm pain are “the least technical in nature and are
the most amenable to comprehension by a lay jury.”). Unconvincingly, Appellees
assume that this is only applicable to establishing disability, and an expert witness
is required in establishing necessity. See Resp. Br. at 29. However, Appellees fail
to articulate any reason why this distinction is meaningful. In fact, the case that
Appellees rely on, Matarese, explicitly applies the layperson standard for
necessity. Matarese, at 365.
Therefore, the Scogginses testimony is well within the scope of common
knowledge of the layperson and demonstrates necessity. When the disputed facts

9

See also Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 701. If a witness is not testifying as an
expert, testimony in the form of an opinion is limited to one that is (a) rationally
based on the witness’ perception; (b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness’
testimony or to determining a fact in issue; and (c) not based on scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.
24

are viewed in a light most favorable to the Scogginses, summary judgment is
inappropriate.
B.

There Is A Genuine Issue Of Fact Concerning Jacob’s Ability To
Operate An ATV.

The Scogginses submitted sufficient evidence to establish reasonableness as
a triable issue. See Opening Br. at 20–21. Though Appellees attempt to
characterize the key facts to the reasonableness issue as “undisputed,” the parties
clearly dispute whether Jacob can safely operate an ATV. Resp. Br. at 30; J.A. at
166. Therefore, summary judgment was error.
Appellees only argue that the accommodation is unreasonable because “it
would be unsafe for him and for other members of the community and the public.”
Resp. Br. at 30. Appellees’ entire argument centers on attacking the safety of the
accommodation. Id. However, the Scogginses submitted a substantial amount of
evidence rebutting this argument. See Opening Br. at 20–21.
For example, Jacob testified that he can indeed operate the ATV safely, and
the Scogginses submitted a video of Jacob operating the ATV in a safe manner.
J.A. at 1264. Appellees argue that Jacob cannot operate the ATV without torso
support, yet Jacob has stated numerous times that Appellees’ argument is incorrect
and demonstrated it on the video. J.A. at 45, 475–77, 481. Appellees point to the
fact that the ATV does not have a “torso belt,” in reference to the Woodrow
Wilson Report. Resp. Br. at 33. During Jacob’s deposition, however, Jacob stated
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numerous times he was instructed that he did not require the “torso belt.” J.A. at
485–87, 520–21.
Once again, contrary to Appellees’ assertion, usage of the ATV presents an
issue of disputed facts. When viewed in a light most favorable to the Scogginses,
Appellees’ safety concerns are refuted. As the Appellees’ sole objection to the
reasonableness of the accommodation is centered on the argument that it is an
“unsafe practice,” the Scogginses met their burden to establish reasonableness, and
summary judgment should be reversed.
IV.

THE RECORD PROVIDES SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF
DISCRIMINATION BY APPELLEE MERRITT.
Appellee Merritt alleges that “the uncontested facts make clear that the

Scogginses cannot establish” that Merritt should be personally liable for his
discriminatory behavior. Resp. Br. at 47. Merritt attempts to shield himself from
liability by claiming that “at all times relevant…Merritt was acting in his capacity
as an officer and board member of the association.” Id. However, personal liability
can be assessed where the person discriminating does so intentionally in reliance
upon the trial court’s opinion and Martin v. Constance, 843 F. Supp. 1321 (E.D.
Mo. 1994). Scoggins v. Lee’s Crossing Homeowners Ass’n, 1:10–CV–1157–LO,
2011 WL 4578409 (E.D. Va., Sept. 29, 2011) (“It is clear that an officer or board
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member of the HOA cannot be held vicariously liable for the acts of the HOA
unless the evidence shows that he or she acted with discriminatory intent.”)
In contrast, Merritt engages in a lengthy, unnecessary discussion of Meyer v.
Holley, 537 U.S. 280 (2003). Meyer is inapplicable. The Scogginses do not argue
that Merritt should be held vicariously liable through the principles of agency;
rather, the Scogginses contend that Merritt should be liable for his own actions.
Because Merritt, in the Response, does not distinguish the rule cited by the
trial court (that an officer or board member of the HOA can be held liable for the
acts of the HOA if he or she acted with discriminatory intent), the authority is
therefore conceded. See Martin, 843 F. Supp. at 1325, (“A plaintiff can show a
violation of section 3604(f) by . . . showing discriminatory intent on the part of the
defendants.”
A.

Summary Judgment Was Improper Because There Is A Dispute
Of Fact Regarding Whether Appellee Merritt Intentionally
Discriminated Against The Scogginses.

Discriminatory intent can be shown by circumstantial or direct evidence of
intent. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 266 (1977). Indirect or circumstantial evidence can suffice to prove state
of mind because direct evidence of discriminatory intent is seldom available.
Warren v. Halstead Indus., Inc., 802 F.2d 746, 752 (4th Cir. 1986) (quoting U.S.
Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714, (1983)). Plaintiff’s
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evidence of discriminatory intent need not show that the handicapped status of the
intended inhabitants was the sole factor of the defendant’s decision to seek
enforcement of the restrictive covenant, only that it was a motivating factor.
Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 255–66.
Appellees state that the evidence put forth by the Scogginses is “not
grounded in fact.” See Resp. Br. at 47. However, the Scogginses recite the
evidence they alleged as proof of Merritt’s discriminatory actions in their Opening
Br. at 46–50. This evidence is not refuted by Merritt in his response. Therefore, the
Scogginses have alleged sufficient direct, indirect, and circumstantial evidence of
discrimination. Id.
In his response, Merritt argues for a higher standard than the one established
by relevant authority. Merritt states “neither the Scoggins[es] nor their witnesses…
were able at their depositions to identify a single derogatory statement made by
Merritt or any discriminatory or derogatory conduct directed toward Jacob
Scoggins.” Resp. Br. at 50. However, this is not the standard. See Warren v.
Halstead Indus., Inc., 802 F.2d 746, 752 (4th Cir. 1986) (“Indirect or
circumstantial evidence can suffice to prove state of mind since direct evidence of
discriminatory intent is seldom available”) (emphasis added); See also Scoggins’
Opening Br. at 45, citing Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 255–66 (“Plaintiff’s
evidence of discriminatory intent need not show that the handicapped status of the
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intended inhabitants was the sole factor of the defendant’s decision to seek
enforcement of the restrictive covenant, only that it was a motivating factor.”).
Appellee Merritt additionally refers to the observations and opinions of the
Scogginses and their “friends” as “subjective” to match the language of Goldberg
v. Green and Co., Inc., 836 F.2d 845 (Cir. 1988). See Resp. Br. at 50.
In Goldberg, this Court held that the plaintiff’s “own naked opinion, without
more is not enough to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination.” Id. at
847. Appellees rely on this authority to conclude that the opinions of the
Scogginses’ witnesses, George Garsson, Victor DeAnthony, and Terrance Tracey,
under oath, are somehow “bereft of any factual[ity]” because they are subjective
opinions of “friends.” See Resp. Br. at 50. Merritt’s reliance on Goldberg is
misplaced because Goldberg only decided the evidentiary inadequacy of plaintiff’s
own, subjective “naked opinion.” Goldberg, 836 F.2d at 848
In this case, the Scogginses have alleged more than their own “naked
opinion,” which is evidenced by direct and consistent corroborative evidence from
multiple witnesses (Garsson, DeAnthony, Tracey). This is exactly the kind of
evidence that the plaintiff in Goldberg failed to bring. Merritt implies, when
discussing the Scogginses’ witnesses as “friends” that their testimony is somehow
less reliable, at one point going as far as to state:
When pressed to provide a basis for the statements made in their
declarations under penalty of perjury, all retreated to the same position
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claiming that it was the “tone” of the meeting that led them to conclude in
their own minds that Mr. Merritt opposed the request.
See Resp. Br. at 54. It is unclear what standard of evidence Merritt requests the
Scogginses meet. The Scogginses produced three witnesses to corroborate their
allegations. The fact that these witnesses concluded “... in their own minds that Mr.
Merritt opposed the request,” only demonstrates that three different witnesses
“subjectively” came to the same conclusion. Unlike the plaintiff in Goldberg, the
evidence supporting the Scogginses’ allegations is not a subjective conclusion
isolated to the “naked opinion” of the Scogginses. When taken in the light most
favorable to the Scogginses it demonstrates that there is an issue of material fact
regarding Merritt’s discriminatory actions and intent.
Moreover, Merritt concedes the existence of an issue of material fact. See
Resp. Br. at 52–54. By bringing competing witness testimony to rebut the
Scogginses, Merritt concludes, “The Scoggins[es]’ final, desperate claims related
to Merritt’s treatment of them related to the violations are also clearly contradicted
by the facts.” Id. at 54. Therefore, Merritt concedes that this case presents issues of
“contradictory facts.” As issues of fact remain, summary judgment regarding the
issue of Merritt’s personal liability should be reversed.
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CROSS APPELLEE’S RESPONSE BRIEF
ARGUMENT
This Court should affirm the District Court’s decision denying the CrossAppellants’ motion for attorneys’ fees and costs under the Fair Housing Act, 42
U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2) (“FHA”). The District Court correctly held that awarding
attorneys’ fees in this case would run contrary to the public policy goals of the
FHA. J.A. at 304. Importantly, the District Court properly found that the CrossAppellees’ lawsuit was not “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.” Id. at
303; see Bryant Woods, 124 F.3d 597, 606. Cross-Appellees provided sufficient
facts for both the ATV and the ramp request to establish that the claims were
brought in good faith and with ample legal foundation. Moreover, the District
Court’s entry of summary judgment in Cross-Appellants’ favor does not signify
Cross-Appellees’ claims were frivolous. Finally, the Fair Housing Act, along with
the case law and other authority interpreting it, trumps any contrary fee-shifting
provisions within Virginia contracts. For these reasons, this Court should affirm
the District Court’s denial of Cross-Appellants’ motion for attorneys’ fees and
costs.
A.

THE PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS UNDERLYING
THE FHA DO NOT SUPPORT AWARDING THE CROSSAPPELLANTS’ ATTORNEYS’ FEES IN THIS CASE.

The strong policy considerations that support awarding attorneys’ fees and
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costs to prevailing plaintiffs in civil rights cases are not available to prevailing
defendants. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 418-19 (1978).
Prevailing plaintiffs are ordinarily awarded attorneys’ fees and costs in all but
special circumstances. Id. at 417. Prevailing defendants, on the other hand, are
awarded fees only upon a finding that the plaintiff’s action was “frivolous,
unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad
faith.” Id. at 417, 421; see Bryant Woods Inn, Inc., 124 F.3d 597, 606 (4th Cir.
1997). The District Court recognized the significance of the Christiansburg
analysis in determining whether to award attorneys’ fees. J.A. at 303. In Bryant
Woods, this Court held that regardless of the substantive outcome, attorneys’ fees
will be denied to a prevailing defendant when a plaintiff has a reasonable legal
basis to initiate and pursue a claim. Id. at 607.
As the District Court correctly stated, “allowing a neighborhood covenant to
provide an end run superseding congressional intent would be contrary to public
policy.” J.A. at 304. “If aggrieved plaintiffs contemplate that they will be forced
to bear attorneys’ fees at the outset of litigation, a congressionally chosen means
to avoid FHA violations might not be pursued.” Id. See also Newman v. Piggie
Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (noting in reference to Title II
of the Civil Rights Act that “[i]f successful plaintiffs were routinely forced to
bear their own attorneys’ fees, few aggrieved parties would be in a position to

32

advance the public interest by invoking the injunctive powers of the federal
courts.”). In light of the public policy considerations surrounding the FHA, this
Court should affirm the District Court’s decision denying Cross-Appellants’
motion for attorneys’ fees and costs.
B.

CROSS-APPELLEES’ CASE WAS NOT FRIVOLOUS,
UNREASONABLE, OR WITHOUT FOUNDATION.

In determining whether a case is frivolous, unreasonable, or without
foundation, this Court has considered factors such as the plaintiff’s reliance on case
law “decided under the Fair Housing Act as authority for its litigation position.”
See Bryant Woods, 124 F.3d at 607 (denying prevailing defendant’s claim for
attorney fees where plaintiff had a reasonable legal basis for initiating and pursuing
its cause of action based on prior cases decided under the FHA). Therefore, despite
Cross-Appellants efforts to “spin” the facts to suit their narrative of victimhood,
the legal question presented to this Court is whether Cross-Appellees brought their
claim in good faith and with sufficient legal foundation.
The test for awarding fees to a prevailing defendant in a civil rights case is
never whether the plaintiff’s claim was successful. Rather, in determining
whether a suit is frivolous, “a district court must focus on the question whether
the case is so lacking in arguable merit as to be groundless or without foundation
rather than whether the claim was ultimately successful.” Jones v. Texas Tech
University, 656 F.2d 1137, 1145 (5th Cir. 1981). A district court should “avoid
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engaging in the post hoc reasoning that because a plaintiff did not prevail, the
claim was necessarily without merit.” See Nester v. Analostan Homes
Association, Inc., 2002 WL 32657214, *1 (E.D. Va. 2002) (citing
Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 422).10 “To award attorneys’ fees simply because a
plaintiff loses the case risks undercutting the intent of Congress to promote
vigorous enforcement of is laws.” Id. Cross-Appellees’ case was replete with
legal support under the FHA (and cases and other authority interpreting it), both
at the motion to dismiss and summary judgment stage. Accordingly, CrossAppellees’ case was not frivolous, unreasonable, or lacking foundation. For these
reasons, this Court should affirm the District Court’s decision denying CrossAppellants’ motion for attorneys’ fees and costs.
1.

The ATV Request.

It is undisputed that the covenants allow a homeowner to petition the LCHA
for an exemption to use an ATV in the streets of Lee’s Crossing. J.A. at 44, ¶ 3,
374, and 383. It is also undisputed that Debbie Scoggins provided a written request
on May 19, 2009, requesting such exemption as a reasonable accommodation. J.A.

10

Accord Johnson v. City of Chesapeake, Va., 2002 WL 32593922, *10 (E.D. Va.
2002) (successful motion to dismiss was not enough by itself to entitle prevailing
defendants to attorneys’ fees where court could not say claims were frivolous,
unreasonable, or groundless); Wells v. Willow Lake Estates, Inc., 2010 WL
572731, *4 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (defendants not entitled to attorneys’ fees despite
court granting two motions to dismiss claims that were not sufficiently frivolous,
unreasonable, and without merit).
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at 44–45. The Cross-Appellants failed to produce any evidence that the Scoggins
were ever contacted about the LCHA Board’s alleged desire to discuss the ATV
request, or letting the Scoggins know that the ATV request would be discussed at
the July and September 2009 LCHA Board meetings. J.A. at 47–48, 58. Although
property manager Mike Arndt circulated a draft email to the LCHA Board
members, there is no evidence that the email was ever sent to the Scoggins, and the
Scoggins have denied under oath that it or any other communication from the
LCHA regarding the May 19, 2009 ATV request was ever received prior to their
second request some sixteen months later. J.A. at 177–178, n.8. Moreover, several
Lee’s Crossing residents who attended the September 2009 LCHA Board meeting
provided sworn testimony that derogatory and condescending comments were
made about the Cross-Appellees by Merritt and Mrs. Merritt, and that Merritt and
Mrs. Merritt were opposed to the ATV request from the outset of the September
2009 LCHA Board meeting. J.A. at 48; 177.
In opposition to Cross-Appellants’ Motion to Dismiss, Cross-Appellees
cited the Joint HUD/DOJ Accommodations Statement as authority for their
position that a one year delay should be deemed a failure to provide a reasonable
accommodation request. Cross-Appellees’ argument was bolstered by the District
Court’s denial of the Motion to Dismiss and its recognition that the CrossAppellants had “put off the hearing” on the ATV request. Supp. J.A. at 2992.
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At the summary judgment stage, Cross-Appellees provided extensive
authority to support their position that Cross-Appellants effectively denied the
ATV request. While the District Court did not ultimately agree that the CrossAppellants’ actions constituted an intentional delay, Cross-Appellees cited
significant authority that overwhelmingly supported the conclusion that a sixteenmonth delay could constitute a denial. J.A. at 56–57, 173–175.
First, with respect to undue delay constituting an actual or constructive
denial of the ATV request, Cross-Appellees included relevant citation to the Joint
HUD/DOJ Accommodations Statement, at least five federal circuit opinions,
including two that specifically cited the Joint HUD/DOJ Accommodations
Statement in their analysis, as well as several district court opinions.11 Id. In
addition, Cross-Appellees provided extensive authority to support their position
that it was the Cross-Appellants’ affirmative duty to investigate and engage in an
interactive process in response to a reasonable accommodation request. J.A. at 5758; 178-179. Although the District Court reached the conclusion that CrossAppellees failed to meet their evidentiary burden on the “reasonable” and
“necessary” elements, this hardly means Cross-Appellees’ ATV claim was
completely lacking foundation.
With regard to the reasonable element, and Jacob Scoggins’ ability to safely
11

The cases also indicated that the Joint HUD/DOJ Accommodations Statement
was to be accorded substantial and/or controlling deference. Id. at 56–57, n.11.
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operate the ATV, Cross-Appellees produced day-in-the-life videos of Jacob
Scoggins which demonstrated his strength and physical capability to safely operate
the ATV and to easily transfer on and off the ATV. J.A. at 66. Dan Scoggins also
provided sworn testimony that he spent a significant amount of time training Jacob
Scoggins on the operation of the ATV. J.A. at 46. A subsequent Woodrow Wilson
report also indicated that Jacob Scoggins no longer needed a support device for
trunk control support when operating a vehicle. J.A. at 45, 46, and 576. Moreover,
Cross-Appellants’ expert witness reached his conclusions without ever examining
Jacob Scoggins or viewing the day-in-the-life videos. Indeed, he never even
provided sworn testimony to the District Court in support of his opinion. CrossAppellants submitted his unsworn report in support of their Motion for Summary
Judgment.
With regard to the necessary element, Cross-Appellants’ expert witness is
not a medical expert, physician, or physical therapist, and has no demonstrable
qualification to render an opinion about the ATV’s effect on Jacob’s body or
disability. On the other hand, based on his interactions with his physicians and
therapists, it is not entirely unreasonable to conclude that Jacob Scoggins had a
competent understanding about the effects of excessive wheeling to his shoulders
when traversing in his manual wheelchair over unstable terrain. J.A. at 185. It is
not entirely unreasonable to conclude that Jacob Scoggins has a competent
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understanding about the costly effects that dusty, gravelly roads will have on his
power wheelchair after interacting with the professionals who sold it to him. Id.
Cross-Appellees provided support for the legal conclusion that a layman can
express an opinion on matters appropriate for expert testimony when the lay
witness has personalized knowledge of facts underlying the opinion. J.A. at 186187. An action is deemed frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis in law or in
fact. Allmond v. Mosley, 2002 WL 32376941, *1 (E.D. Va. 2002). See also
Cavines v. Somers, 235 F.2d 455, 456 (4th Cir.1956) (stating that a complaint is
frivolous if it is “utterly without merit”). Cross-Appellees’ ATV claim was not
frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.
Finally, Cross-Appellees never intentionally mislead the District Court with
respect to the ATV, and Jacob Scoggins did not intentionally mislead the District
Court with his initial declaration. J.A. at 185. The references to his specially
adapted ATV, and needing the ATV to get to a neighbor’s house, were accurate at
one time. Id. Jacob was forthcoming about his misunderstanding in his subsequent
declaration and was forthcoming in his deposition when he explained that the ATV
was manufactured with hand controls, an automatic clutch, and other equipment.
Id. None of which negated the fact that he could operate the ATV.
“An award of attorneys’ fees against a losing plaintiff in a civil rights action
is an extreme sanction that must be limited to truly egregious cases of
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misconduct.” Jones v. Continental Corp., 789 F.2d 1225, 1232 (6th Cir. 1986). As
the District Court recognized, Cross-Appellees’ conduct does not rise to that level.
2.

The Ramp Request.

Cross-Appellees’ access ramp claim also had ample legal foundation. In
opposition to Cross-Appellants’ Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs cited the Joint
HUD/DOJ Modifications Statement12 and HUD’s implementing regulations of the
Fair Housing Act which supported the contention that the Cross-Appellees’ ramp
request is sufficient to trigger the protections of the FHA if made orally, and that
the Cross-Appellants were placing unreasonable conditions on the request which
constituted a denial. In denying Cross-Appellants’ Motion to Dismiss at oral
argument, the District Court ruled that the LCHA requirements were “not binding
on the Fair Housing Act,” and that compelling Cross-Appellees to build the ramp
in their garage “was unreasonable to begin with, but they complied with it.” Supp.
J.A. at 2999. Accordingly, there was nothing about Cross-Appellees’ claim that
was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.
At the summary judgment stage, Cross-Appellees also provided extensive
authority to support their position on the ramp request. Although the District Court

12

At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, Cross-Appellees’ counsel provided the
Court with citation to a 4th Circuit case that indicated the deference accorded to
the Joint HUD/DOJ Modifications Statement was more than the deference afforded
in Chevron. Supp. J.A. at 2992.
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did not agree with Cross-Appellees’ arguments and determined that CrossAppellees failed to show “necessity” for the ramp, Cross-Appellees provided legal
authority that would support the opposite conclusion. The Joint HUD/DOJ
Modifications Statement, which is to be accorded substantial or controlling
deference, places an emphasis on adding an access ramp to make the primary
entrance of a home accessible to wheelchair users. J.A. at 60–61, 179–180. In
addition, Cross-Appellees provided case law to support the argument that the
necessary element is linked to the goal of equal opportunity to use and enjoy a
dwelling the same way non-disabled persons enjoy a residence, which normally
would have been the front entrance of the Scoggins home. Id. at 187. Moreover,
the Court had already come to the conclusion at the motion to dismiss stage that
the garage was an unreasonable alternative. Supp. J.A. at 2999.
In granting Cross-Appellants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, the District
Court found “no reason why the modification should not be subject to the process
delineated by the Protective Covenants and the aesthetic approval of the
Architectural Review Board. If Cross-Appellees complete the process and provide
the relevant details to the ARB, the ramp could be approved.” However, CrossAppellees provided legal authority that could support the opposite conclusion.
First, HUD’s implementing regulations, which are entitled to Chevron
deference, specify that a reasonable modification can only be subject to: (1) a
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reasonable description of the proposed modifications, (2) reasonable assurances
that the work will be done in a workmanlike manner, and (3) that any required
building permits will be obtained. J.A. at 60. Second, the Joint HUD/DOJ
Modifications Statement, which has been accorded substantial or controlling
deference by other courts, states that a reasonable modification request can be
made orally and the requester does not have to use a provider’s preferred forms or
procedures for making such requests. Id. at 61. While the housing provider can
require the requester to: 1) obtain any needed building permits, 2) perform the
work in a workmanlike manner, and 3) provide a reasonable description of the
proposed modifications, a description of the modification may be provided either
orally or in writing depending on the extent and nature of the proposed
modification.13 Id at 62-63. The regulations and the Joint HUD/DOJ Modifications
Statement do not require the submission of detailed plans, designs, and
specifications for construction, exterior colors, materials, landscaping, outside
lighting, drawings depicting changes to existing topography and proposed
landscape improvements – the elements which Cross-Appellants complain were
lacking in the Cross-Appellants’ request. Id.

13

It is certainly reasonable to argue that an access ramp for the front exterior of a
large home that sits on a ten (10) acre homestead is not going to have a significant
aesthetic impact on Lee’s Crossing, other than to allow Jacob Scoggins to use and
enjoy his home the way his non-disabled family members and friends do.
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C.

AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS BASED ON
THE FEE-SHIFTING PROVISION IN THE LEE’S CROSSING
COVENANTS IS INAPPROPRIATE IN A FAIR HOUSING ACT
CASE.

In 1988, the FHA was amended to make its attorneys’ fees provisions
consistent with the attorneys’ fees provisions of other civil rights statutes.
Congress adopted language that parallels the attorneys’ fees provision in the 1964
Civil Rights Act14 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988.15 Both of these provisions have been
interpreted to allow defendants to recover attorneys’ fees only if the plaintiff’s case
is “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.” Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at
422 (interpreting the fee-shifting provision in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k)); Hughes v.
Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14 (1980) (interpreting the fee-shifting provision in 42 U.S.C. §
1988). The Christiansburg standard has been applied by this Court to attorneys’
fee awards under the Fair Housing Act. See, e.g., Bryant Woods Inn, at 606 - 607.
The purpose of an attorneys’ fees award under 42 U.S.C.A. § 3613(c)(2) is
to encourage individuals injured by discriminatory housing practices to vindicate
their own rights, as well as the public interest in eradicating housing
discrimination. Bethishou v. Levy, 1989 WL 122435, *1 (N.D. Ill. 1989). An
14

The 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), provides that “the court, in
its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorneys’ fee ... as
part of the costs ...”
15

42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) was amended in 1976 to read: “the court, in its discretion,
may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorneys’ fee as part of the costs.”
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attorneys’ fees award under 42 U.S.C.A. § 3613(c)(2) encourages private
enforcement of the Fair Housing Act that allows individuals injured by
discriminatory housing practices to vindicate their own rights as well as promote
the public interest in eradicating housing discrimination. City of Chicago v.
Matchmaker Real Estate Sales Center, Inc., 1991 WL 255582, *1 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
The eradication of housing discrimination is a policy that Congress considered to
be of the highest priority. Id. Plaintiffs in Fair Housing Act litigation function as
private attorney generals enforcing a policy that Congress considered of the highest
importance. Cole v. Wodziak, 1998 WL 395162, *5 (N.D. Ill. 1998), aff’d on other
grounds, 169 F.3d 486 (7th Cir. 1999). Congress enacted the fee shifting provision
specifically because the private market for legal services was such that the ordinary
citizen could not afford to purchase legal services at prevailing rates. Id.
The argument advanced by Cross-Appellants – that a fee shifting provision
in the Lee’s Crossing Covenants should be applied in an FHA case – flies in direct
contravention of an important Congressional goal, and is directly at odds with the
interpretation enunciated by the Supreme Court, and applied by the this Court to
attorneys’ fee awards under the FHA.
Moreover, allowing the Cross-Appellants to apply what is tantamount to a
“loser pays” rule would impose a “chilling effect” on future litigants attempting to
vindicate their rights under the FHA. Foster v. Barilow, 6 F.3d 405, 408 (6th Cir.
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1993); Sassower v. Field, 973 F.2d 75, 79, (2d Cir. 1992); Clark v. Oakhill
Condominium Association, Inc., 2011 WL 1296719, *6 (N.D. Ind. 2011). Taken to
its logical conclusion, the Lee’s Crossing Covenants could be amended at a future
date to include a provision where a plaintiff resident would be barred from
bringing a Fair Housing Act claim altogether.16

16

It should also be noted that (a) Jacob Scoggins is not an owner of the property
and, therefore, cannot be liable under the fee shifting clause in homeowners
documents to which he is not a party; and (b) his parents were added as Plaintiffs
at the Defendant’s insistence on the grounds that Jacob Scoggins (a nonhomeowner) was not able to assert a claim on his own behalf. Supp. J.A. at 2976,
n.1. (“Had the parents brought suit … they would have an FHA cause of action …
Jacob Scoggins lacks standing to maintain this action”). In this context, therefore,
shifting fees would be highly inequitable.
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CONCLUSION
The Scogginses respectfully request that this Court reverse and remand the
Order of the trial court granting Summary Judgment to Appellees. In the event this
Court affirms the trial court’s order granting Appellees’ Motion for Summary
Judgment, it should likewise affirm the District Court’s ruling denying
Appellees/Cross-Appellants’ motion for attorneys’ fees and costs.
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Appellants/Cross-Appellees respectfully requests that this Court hear oral
argument in this case.
Respectfully submitted,
July 30, 2012

By: /s/ Miguel M. de la O

J. Damian Ortiz
The John Marshall Law School
Fair Housing Legal Clinic
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